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MOOT COURT
SITHE vs. BATTLEMIAN.
Gifts-Inter vivos and causa mortis-Elements of each-Treasuretrove.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Battleman had buried sums of money in various places about his estate,
and being ill and hardly able to walk, took his daughter, the defendant, to the
whereabouts of the money, and told her definitely the several places where it
was concealed, with a positive declaration that he gave it to her, cautioning
her not to let any one else know where it was, and advising her to leave it
there until the place was rented or she needed it. In answer to the father's
question, whether if he should get well, and should want some of it, she would
give it to him, she said, "Yes, if you get well you can have all of it. " The
defendant did not remove it until after her father's death. This is an action
by the administrator to recover the money.
Barnhartfor plaintiff.
This can not be a gift inter vivos nor causa mortis. A gift inter vivos to
take effect in the future is void. 14 A. & E. Enc., 1015.
A valid gift, causa mortis, must be made in view of the donor's impending
death; and there must be a delivery of the thing given before the death of the
donor. 14 A. & E. Euc., 1054. A gift either causa mortis or inter vivos, in
order to be valid must be completely executed and go into immediate effect.
Walsh's Appeal, 122 Pa. 177.
Reeser for defendant.
When things cannot be delivered, if the donor do what he can to transfer
the possession to the donee, it will be sufficient. Lewis's Estate, 139 Pa. 640.
It is useless to go through the mere ceremony of manual delivery, when
the evident intent is to part with the possession, cease to exercise dominion
over it, and there is an intent to assume immediate possession on the part of
the donee. Kreider v. Boyer, 10 Watts 59; Herr's Appeal, 5 W. & S. 494.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

HELLER, J. :--The question by which the court is confronted in this case
is whether the acts and words of the decedent constituted a valid gift.
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It must be borne in mind that the transaction was between father and
daughter; that they had not the benefit of legal advice to guide them and
moreover that the father had little or no faith in banks, hence his depositing
his money in the various places about his estate. Had the conditions been
other than those stated, there possibly would have been a formal delivery and
this controversy never have arisen.
The question may be asked, what is a gift? It may be defined to be a
voluntary, immediate and absolute transfer of property without consideration.
There must be property, or some chattel or thing of which the donor has the
possession or the right of possession. The transfer or conveyance of such
property must be made without consideration, otherwise it is more properly a
contract. The transfer must be voluntary, immediate and absolute. Did this
gift have these elements?
As to there being property to which the donor had the right of possession,
there is no question. We can at the same time eliminate the question of
consideration.
The administrators rely upon the statement of the daughter for the fact
that there was money, also as to where it was located, and this statement was
derived voluntarily from the daughter. They have chosen to rely on that
statement in support of their demand, and they are consequently bound to
accredit their own witness by accepting her testimony in its entirety.
According to this narration the decedent took his daughter, showed her where
the money was concealed, gave it to her, cautioned her not to let any one
know its locality, and advised her to leave it there until the property was
sold or rented, or she needed it. A more effectual delivery of property than
this could not well have been made. Certainly the transfer was complete
when access to the funds was placed within the control of the donee. The
subsequent words of the father, when he asked whether if he should get well
and should want some of it, she would give it to him, is further evidence that
he had made a delivery of the money to his daughter.
Itappears that all the incidents to a valid gift were present in the transaction, and judgment is therefore given for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The question presented for solution is the efficacy of an alleged gift. The
law recognizes two forihs of gifts, viz.: inter vivos and caa
mortis. The
latter have been defined as gifts of personal property, made by the donor,
under apprehension of impending death, effectuated by delivery, and defeasible
by resumption thereof by the donor, his recovery from that which occasioned
his apprehension, or by the prior death of the donee. Gardner on Wills, p. 13.
Although the facts given disclose some of the characteristic features of a
donation causa mortis, there is lacking the essential element of apprehension
of impending death, and, we were first inclined to think of its being personal
property, by reason of its incorporation by burial with the soil. As to this latter
point no cases shedding any strong light have been brought to our attention,
but making use of treasure trove as an analogy, and the intention of the owner
as controlling in the law of fixtures, we are persuaded the money was not converted by its burial into realty. However, it is not decisive of the case to
distinguish between the two classes of gifts, there being an insufficient
delivery, fatal alike to either supposition. 2 Kent, 566. It is admitted that
the sufficiency in law of a delivery depends largely upon the nature of the
thing to be delivered. Delivery is the placing of a person in legal possession,
that is in physical control or dominion over the particular object. It is a
conferring of a power to exclude others, the former owner included. The
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cases approving symbolical deliverance by keys of a room or trunk are consistent with this relinquishment of dominion. But it is evident the donor in
this case performed no act of such an unequivocal or compromising nature
that the law might deem a delivery of the buried money. It is true a secret
was divulged, which in respect to the world at large, placed the defendant
in a position of great advantage, but for the donor there was still the locus
poenitentiae. He actually relinquished no part of his physical control or
dominion over his property, and it can hardly be conceived that as against
the donor a court of equity would have interfered to give effect to a gift left
so inchoate and imperfect. The property in question being, therefore, a part
of the estate of the deceased, the administrator is entitled to recover.
Judgment of the lower court reversed and judgment entered for the
plaintiff.

BENJAMIN vs. CLARK.
Mortgages-Sale of portion of mortgagedpremises-Release-Orderof satisfactionfrom alienedportions.
STATEMENT 0F THE CASE.

Aubrey mortgages to Benjamin 500 acres of land for $10,000. This
mortgage is recorded. Aubrey subsequently sells and conveys to Clark 250
acres of this land. Clark has his deed recorded and enters into possession.
Subsequently to this, Benjamin, the mortgagee, knowing of Clark's
possession, but having no actual knowledge of this sale to Clark, releases at
request of Aubrey the 250 acres which remain unsold from the lien of his
mortgage. The release is made to Davis at Aubrey's request, who thereupon
conveys the 250 acres to Davis. Aubrey becomes insolvent.
Benjamin seeks in the first instance, to apply, in satisfaction of his
mortgage, the 250 acres sold to Clark.
Barnerfor the plaintiff.
A release made by mortgagee after sale of part of land by mortgagor is
release of whole lien provided he has knowledge of the sale previously made.
McIlvaine v. Ins. Co., 93 Pa. 30. Mortgagee not bound to search record to
discover prior sales. Schrack v. Shriner, 100 Pa. 451 ; 3 Trickett, Liens. sec.
179. If part i sold subject to whole lien, purchaser has no equity against the
part remaining unsold, which may be released. Wilbur's Appeal, 10 W. N. C.
133.
Bowman for the defendant.
When several pieces of land under a common incumbrance are sucessively aliened, and the latter pieces aliened are released from the lien of the
incumbrance, the first piece aliened cannot be held liable for the lien of the
incumbrance. Martin's Appeal, 97 Pa. 85; Turner v. Flenniken, 164 Pa. 469;
Paxton v. Harrier, 11 Pa. 312.
OPINION OF TCE COURT.

J. :-In this case the mortgagee seeks to apply in satisfaction
of his mortgage the lots sold to the defendant, being the first sold by mortgagor. The law as laid down in Pennsylvania is that pieces of land subject to a
common incumbrance when sold successively are liable to incumbrance in the
inverse order of alienation. Turner v. Flenniken, 164 Pa. 469; Amanda
Martin's Appeal, 97 Pa. 85.
If the present plaintiff recovers, the defendant, Clark, will have no remedy
against Davis, to whom the remaining 2.50 acres were subsequently released.
Paxton vs. Harrier, 11 Pa. 312.
BRADDOCK,
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The court is of the opinion that the recording of the deed by Clark, and
Clark's possession of the land in question was sufficient notice to put Benjamin
on his guard, as required by Turner vs. Flenniken, 164 Pa. 469. Inasmuch as
the present plaintiff admitted in court that 250 acres released to Davis covered
$10,000, the plaintiff has no standing in this court.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

This is a sci fa sur mortgage. The mortgagee seeks to apply a part of the
mortgaged land in the hands of the mortgagor's vendee to payment of the
mortgage debt. The defendant terre tenant never assumed payment of the
mortgage and accordingly invokes the equitable rule first asserted in Railer v.
Stanley, 10 S. & R. 450, and adhered to in a long line of cases extending over
a period of eighty years, an epitome of which may be found in the following
language of Gordon J., Martin's Appeal, 97 Pa. 85: "If a mortgagor or judgment debtor has a lot or parcel of land, say of ten acres, and of this he sells
five to B, the remaining five acres, if, of sufficient value, must sustain the
whole charge, and the part sold to B cannot be made to contribute until that
remaining in the debtor or mortgagor has been exhausted; and this rule
extends to purchaser of the encumbered premises, and in an order inverse to
the date of their several -titles. The burthen falls first upon the last purchaser,
and it is only after the fund arising from this source has been consumed, that
resort can be had to that which is antecedent, and so on in regular order, until
the land of the first purchaser is reached, which'is the last to be called on for
contribution and then only to the amount of what remains of the original
charge after the lands post dating it in title have been exhausted." Of
course, if part is sold subject to the whole lien, the purchaser has no equity
against the part remaining unsold. Wilbur's Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 133.
The equitable effect, therefore, of a sale of part of the encumbered premises,
ordinarily is to cast the burden of the mortgage debt primarily on the remainder, and the rule applies as well between a mortgagor and purchaser as between subsequent purchasers. The theory" is that the alienated land stands
merely surety for the debt.
This equitable marshalling may by appropriate rule at the instance of the
owner of a parcel secondarily liable to be enforced against the holder of the
mortgage, compelling him to first seek satisfaction out of the parcels primarily
liable. Accordingly, it has followed that if the holder of the mortgage, with
knowledge of conveyance of parts of the mortgaged land, release the parcels
primarily liable, the act will discharge the land standing surety, upon well
settled principles of the law of suretyship, for by such wanton act the surety
land, if subjected to the mortgage, would be deprived of reimbursement from
the principal debtor. The holder with notice of the surety's rights having
sacrificed them will be deprived of recourse to the injured party. Schroch v.
Shriner, 100 Pa. 451. But the mere execution of a release, without more, will
not of itself work a discharge of the surety land. "The doctrine is one of
equity jurisprudence, and not of positive law, and hence to affect the conscience of the former (holder of the mortgage) he should have actual and not
merely constructive notice of the equity claimed by the latter", per Sterrett
J., McIlvaine v. Mutual Asso. Co., 93 Pa. 30. There is no duty incumbent
upon the holder of the mortgage to search the records to discover alienation of
parts of the premises. 3 Trickett on Liens, sec. 179. In fact, it is laid down in
the McIlvaine case supra, that the duty of acquainting the mortgagee of
changes in title is incumbent upon the respective grantors, and a failure by
the latter so to do, may be considered negligence on their part.
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follows that the
If this exposition of the principles of law be correct, it,
learned court below erroneously entered judgment for the defendant. Two
facts should have been clearly ascertained: (1), did the plaintiff have actual
knowledge of the conveyances to defendant, either before or at the time of the
release? On this point the possession of the defendant, although not conclusive by any means, would be persuasive evidence; (2), was the released land
sufficient to satisfy the mortgage?
"If this question was involved in doubt, it should have been submitted to
the jury with instructions." Turner v. Flenniken, 164 Pa. 469. Judgment
is therefore reversed and a venirefaciasde novo awarded.

COMMONWEALTH vs. JONES ET AL.
.Larceny-Gold fish in a private pond are property-Ownership in
placing them there and no reclamationnecessary.

him

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Wright, having acquired the privilege from Smith, the owner, stocks a
pond with gold fish. Pratt has been granted by the owner the right to take
water from the pond for domestic purposes. The defendants, servants of Pratt,
while at the pond remove from the same about one thousand of the gold fish
and sell them, receiving about fifty dollars for the number. Wright makes
the information against the defendants.
Cortelyou for the Commonwealth.
Animals of qualified property are fish in a private pond. While such
property exists in them they are under protection of owner and an action will
lie against one who unlawfully takes or destroys them. 2 Blacks., 393.
Waters vs. Lilley, 4 Pick. 199; Chalder vs. Dickinson, 1 Conn. 382; McFarlan
vs. Essex Co., 10 Cush. 308.
Hick'for the defendants.
Fish, unless reclaimed, confined or dead and valuable for food, are not to
be considered subject of larceny. State vs. Krider, 78 N. C. 48.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

BOWMAN, J. :-The question whether or not animals and fishes are.property
is one that has never been definitely decided'in Pennsylvania. It is the only
question to be considered in this suit. If gold fish, confined in a pond for the
purpose of propagation, are personal property, then the defendants are guilty
of larceny.
In Wallis v. Mease, 3 Binney 546, it was held that bees, in their natural
state, confined in a tree, are not property, so that one taking them is not committingafelony. Thequestion whether or not they were sufficiently reclaimed
to be the personal property of the owner of the tree was discussed in that case,
and it was held that they were not.
The text books seem to thus broadly lay down the rule, that fishes and
animals in their wild and free state are not property, and that to become
property they must be reclaimed or confined by the one asserting ownership.
In Wallis v. Mease, supra, the bees were in a tree. They could have gone
at any time to a tree on the neighbor's land. It was, therefore, rightly decided,
we think, that they were not sufficiently reclaimed to be property.
Many Pennsylvania statutes have been enacted relating to animals and
fishes, but all of them are confined to game animals and fishes, or those known
as food animals and fishes, and the kinds included in those classes are specified
in the Act&. The Acts do not refer to gold fish.

120

THE

FORUM

Therefore, it is only necessary for us to decide whether or not Wright had
reclaimed these fish to such an extent that they were no longer wild and free
and the property of any one who might take them.
We do not know if this pond was large or small, natural or artificial, or
from what source the waters came and to what point they flowed. But we do
know that the pond was the property of Smith ; that Smith gave Wright the
privilege of stocking same with gold fish for the purpose of propagation.
Wright, in pursuance of this authority from Smith, obtained the fish, stocked
the pond and intended that the fish should be there confined for his own
benefit.
We think that in so doing, Wright sufficiently reclaimed the fish so as to
make them his personal property; that in placing them in this private pond
with consent of the owner, and not allowing them to go from the pond into
other waters, he was exercising such control over them as to make his ownership complete.
Judgment for Commonwealth.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The gold fish were once, apparently, in the possession and ownership of
Wright. He stocked the pond with them. The defendants removed about
1,000 of them. Once the property of Wright, it is not apparent that they have
ceased to be such. Putting them in a pond, whence they could not escape,
and whence none could take them save Wright or Smith, or some person
coming to the pond with or without permission, was not a restoration of them
to a state of wildness and ownerlessness. Had they been put in a tub 4
feet in diameter and 2 feet deep, they surely would not become ownerless; nor
if they had b-en put in a tank 20 feet in diameter and 5 feet deep. The
pond is a big tub or tank.
If the proper interpretation of the special verdict be that the 1,000 fish taken
were not those placed in the pond by Wright, but the progeny thereof, we
think the same result should follow.
The offspring of viviparous animals belongs to those to whom the mother
belongs. Of oviparous animals the traceable otfspring should also belong to
the owner of the animals. The fishes were confined within narrow bounds
and only by .wrong to the prosecutor could be taken from him. They could
not escape from his power but by the improper act of man. The bees, in
Wallis v. Mease, 3 Binn. 546, were free to leave the tree where they were
taken, and settle on another, and had they done so, could on no valid ground
have been reclaimed. In this respect they differ from the fish. We think the
decision of the learned trial court sound.
Judgment affirmed.

WHITE vs. WOODWARD.
Contract-Conveyanceof real estate-Statute of Frauds.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

White signed a contract to convey his farm to Woodward for $5,000 and
Woodward agreed to purchase at that price, but Woodward did not sign the
written contract.
White brings this action of assumpsit for the $5,000.
Woodward contends that had he signed and had White not signed, the
Statute of Frauds would have prevented his securing a deed. He claims,

THE FORUM

12

therefore, that to treat both parties alike a vendor should not be allowed to
specifically enforce a contract which he only has signed. He also alleges that
it is the signature of the defendant that is important.
Barner for plaintiff.
Statute of Frauds, 1772, Mar. 21, 1 Sm. L. 389, Par. 1; The Statute of
Frauds was passed for the protection of land owners. Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa.
428. Acceptance by the vendee was sufficient to bind him, for the statute does
not refer to any necessity for the signature of the vendee; to the contract.
Where the contract is without the statute, i. e., those on which the statute has
no effect, damages are given for the full contract price. Thompson v. Shepler,
72 Pa. 160; Murray v. Ellis, 112 Pa. 485.
Laub for defendant
It is a general rule that no estate or interest in land shall pass, but by deed
or some instrument in writing signed by the parties. Woods v. Wallace, 22 Pa.
175; McFarson's Appeal, 11 Pa. 510. A contract signed by only one party
ought not to be specifically enforced against the other party because he can
not have a like remedy. Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. 335.
Where the action of assumpsit is substituted for a bill in equity it must be
decided on equitable principles. Work v. Work, 14 Pa. 318; Gochenauer v.
Cooper, 8 S & R. 199.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

EHLER, J. :-White signed a contract to convey his farm to Woodward for
$.5,000, and Woodward agreed to purchase at that price, but Woodward did
not sign the written contract. White brings this action of assumpsit for the

$.5,000.

Woodward contends that had he signed, and had White not signed, the
Statute ofFrauds would have prevented his securing a deed. He claims, therefore, that to treat both parties alike, a vendor should not be allowed to specifically enforce a contract, which he only has signed. He also alleges that it
is the signature of the defendant that is important.
Woodward's first contention, that had he signed and White not signed,
the Statute of Frauds would in such case prevent him from securing specific
performance, is a correct statement of the law. But this is not the fact, and,
therefore, when used as a premise for his second contention, is non-supporting
and cannot be considered. The second contention is that both parties must be
treated alike and the vendor should not be allowed to enforce specifically a
contract which he alone has signed. This is clearly an equitable principle
and should be applied, if in such case the vendee could not secure specific performance. We must then look to the statute to ascertain whose signature is
required. Our Statute of Frauds provides inter alia,-"From and after April
10, 1772, etc., and moreover that no leases, estates, or interests, either of freehold or terms of years, or any uncertain interests, of, in, to or out of any
messuages, manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments shall at any time after
the said April 10, 1772, be assigned, granted or surrendered unless it be by
deed or note, in writing, signed by the party so assigning, granting or surrendering the same, or their agents, etc." It is then only the lessor or grantor
who is required to sign the agreement. His contract must be in writing
signed by him; but the statute requires no written evidence of the engagement of a lessee or grantee. The Statute of Frauds was passed for the protection of landowners. It was intended to guard them against perjuries in
proof of parol contracts. To secure this, it prescribed a rule of evidence by
which alone their estates can be divested. Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. 428.
Our statute differs, therefore, from the English statute in that it contains
nothing to prohibit the recovery of damages on a parol contract, whereas
qnder the English statute even such an action could not be maintained. In
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Smith & Fleck's Appeal, 69 Pa. 474, where Smith by a paper signed only by
himself, agreed to sell to Raydure, "All that piece of land sold by Rose to
Smith, Raydure to have the refusal 10 days from date," and Raydure gave
verbal notice that he would take tile land, it was held that the contract was
not within the Statute of Frauds, that specific performance could be enforced
and that it was sufficient that a contract be signed by the vendor and it is not
necessary that notice of election to take should be in writing. This case
negatives the contention of the defendant that in additiofi to thesigningofthe
vendor there must be a delivery to the vendee. It is true that in some of the
earlier cases such a delivery occurred, and because of that it was contended
that since it did not appear in the case at bar it came within the statute.
That delivery is unimportant is readily shown by Smith & Fleck's Appeal.
The cases in which it occurred were those in which the deed was delivered and
possession taken, as in Tripp v. Bishop, supra,and even here the deed remained
in the possession of the vendor's agent. In that case the vendor made a deed
for the land and signed it and then sent it to an agent to be delivered. The
vendees examined it, were satisfied, accepted it and paid the hand-money to
the agent. The contract was made and closed at that time. The parties then
agreed that th6 deed remain in the agent's hands until time of credit expired
for the remaining purchase money. What was said in that case is equally
applicable to the case at ar, "nothing remained in parol, but the agreement
to pay the purchase money and the statute does not require that to be in writing." We think also that the land to be conveyed is sufficiently designated
in the contract; though not described by metes and bounds, yet from that
which is stated its description may be ascertained. It is sufficient, therefore,
in order that equity would enforce its specific performance, if the contract is
signed by the vendor,-he being the party to be charged,-if the vendee has
accepted it. McFarson's Appeal, 1 Jones, 503; Shof-stall v. Adams, 2 Grant,
209; Simpson v. Breckenridge, 32 Pa. 287. In the case at bar the vendee
accepted the contract and agreed orally to purchase at the price designated.
It follows that as the requirements of the statute were fulfilled, he also could
have compelled specific performance, as his signature is not required by the
statute; which results frame the necessary mutuality in such a contract.
The case of Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. 335, so strongly relied upon by the
defendant for the doctrine that a contract signed by only one party ought not
to be specifically enforced against the other party because he cannot have a like
remedy, is not applicable here, since both parties have a like remedy. That
case being an action by one vendee against another vendee for contribution.
Where the purchaser refuses to take the property and pay the cash and
give the required securities he makes himself liable for the whole amount of
the purchase money immediately and the damages are to be measured by the
price defendant was to pay. Murray v. Ellis, 112 Pa. 485. But a suit to
recover purchase money on articles of agreement is in the nature of a bill for
specific performance. Hertzberg v. Irwin, 92 Pa. 48; Cook v. Grant, 16 S. &
R., 209, or as said in Wilson v. Clark, 1 W. & S., 554, is substituted for a bill for
specific performance. In such a case it is presumed that the plaintiff has complied with all the conditions which the contract imposed upon him, and on no
other presumption can he recover. He must have tendered a good and sufficient deed before suit brought, otherwise his action fails. Huber v. Burke, 11 S.
& R. 237.
In Murray v. Ellis, 112 Pa. 485, the plaintiff and defendant entered into
written articles of agreement under seal for a sale by the plaintiff to the firm
of Murray & Gill of a certain lot of ground for $21,500. The action was for the
purchase money alleged due under the conditions of sale, which were that the
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lot should be free of incumbrances, $1,500 to be paid on execution of deed and
its delivery, and balance to be secured by a bond and mortgage. Judgment
was given for the plaintiff below, but it was reversed on the grounds that
under the agreement the title had to be marketable and it was shown to be
otherwise. A vendee in an action of ejectment under articles of agreement
who owes a portion of the purchase money, cannot recover possession of the
land from the vendor in the equitable ejectment unless he has tendered the
money before suit brought and has it in court ready to be paid in event of a
verdict in his favor. Dwyer v. Wright, 162 Pa. 405. It follows that the deed
should be filed so that the defendant might have it on payment of the purchase
money. Murray v. Ellis, supra. It does not appear from the facts of the case
at bar whether a tender was made, or whether there was a refusal before
tender. But in any event no deed was tendered or filed in court. The plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to the $5,000 sued for, having failed to comply with
all the conditions imposed upon him by his contract and which in equity he
is bound to perform before recovery can be had in this form of action. It
resolves itself into an action to recover damages for having disaffirmed the
contract. An election of this particular remedy is a waiver of plaintiff's right
to specific performance, it being an implied admission that defendant might
dissaffirm on payment of damages. .Gibson, J., in Huber v. Burke, supra. It
remains for the court to determine the measure of damages recoverable in this
action.
The vendor might have sold the land and held the vendee for damages.
Baney v. Killmer, 1 Pa. 35. It is true that, in Hertzog v. Hertzog, 34 Pa. 418,
where the unanimous opinion of the court was recorded, it was stated in
speaking of assessing damages on a parol contract, "Why then should this
class of contracts be taken out of the general rule that applies to other contracts for land both executory and executed? why should the investigation be
directed to the value of the bargain in direct contravention of the rule in written contracts instead of being directed to the consideration of the bargain as
in those cases?" This would lead to the supposition that the rule in written
contracts both executory and executed was directed merely to the consideration of the bargain. But the parol rule therein deduced was taken from the
rule in reference to covenants of seisin, which is the real consideration paid.
This is also the rule for the measure of damages for the breach of the covenants
of quiet enjoyment and warranty. This then may be presumed to be the
settled principle in regard to written contracts in Pennsylvania, only where
the man, who contracts for land and pays the price and loses it without fraud
in the vendor, brings the action. His recovery being limited to the money
paid and interest thereon or the value of services rendered if this was the form
in which the consideration was paid. Hertzog v. Hertzog was not a case of
an executory written contract and merely laid down the rule of damages for
breach of a parol contract, in the absence of fraud, to be the actual consideration passing between the parties. That is, if the consideration were services
rendered, they are to be compensated according to their value; if moneys
received, they are to be returned with interest; but the value of the bargain is
not the measure. This parol rule being followed in McNair v. Compton,35 Pa.
23 ; Thompson v. Shepler, 72 Pa. 160; Grey v. Howell, 205 Pa. 211. But even in
parol contracts where there is fraud, damages are recoverable for loss of bargain.
Thompson v. Shepler, supra. Now although it has been said that
the same measure of damages has been applied whether the contract were
executed or executory, and that the measure was limited to actual expenses
and payments made, such remarks were made in cases involving parol contracts as McNair v. Compton, supra, and Hertzog v. Hertzog, supra. To ex-
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tend the same rule to an executory written contract would be to abrogate all
differences between parol and written contracts, when as a matter of fact the
parties can always compel specific performance of a valid written contract and
in so doing receive the value of their bargain. If it were otherwise, a party to
such contract would be always compelled to require specific performance in
order that he might recover for the loss of his bargain.
We are of opinion that although refusal to perform is not such fraud as
will enable one of the parties to a parol contract to recover for loss of bargain,
yet where the contract is not within the Statute of Frauds, the plaintiff may
recover for loss of bargain in addition to the actual expenses incurred, as in
the preparation of title papers, etc. The court therefore directs the jury to
find for the plaintiff, in addition to his actual expenses, for the difference between the contract price and the market value of the farm at the time it was
to have been sold.
Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The case before us presents several important questions. We do not think
that any of them present serious difficulty, however. The questions involved
are these: First, "Can a vendor compel specific performance?" Second,
"Should he proceed at law or in equity ?"1 Third, "Does the Statute of Frauds
require that the vendee should have signed the contract ?" Fourth, "Does the
doctrine of mutuality require that the vendee should have signed the
contract ?"
The English courts at an early date permitted a vendor to file a bill in equity
to recover the price the vendee had contracted to pay. The reasons given for
their taking jurisdiction over a suit for a mere sum of money were first, that
the remedy at law was inadequate, and second that the remedy in equity
should be open alike to both parties. In England the recovery at law is
limited to the difference between the contract price and the market price of
the land, at the time of the breach. Laid v. Pim, 7 M. &N. 474. The vendor
must keep his land or find another purchaser. He gets his damages, but not
performance. The remedy is, therefore, inadequate.
In Pennsylvania, Justice Gibson decided in 1824 that the vendor could
recover the entire price in an action of debt. Huber v. Burke, 11 S. & R. 238.
In his effort to do equity without a court of equity, the common law rule was
cast aside ind the action at law was frankly stated as being treated as if it
were a bill in equity. He declared that a vendorshould have specific performance because "justice requiresthat the remedies between the partiesbe mutual."
Cook v. Grant, 16 S. & R. 198.
The acts of 1836 and 1854, (P. & L. Dig., cols. 710 and 713) gave our courts
equity jurisdiction to afford "specific relief, when a recovery in damages
would be an inadequate remedy." This would seem to entitle a vendor to the
aid of equity in his effort to secure the price. In Finley v. Aiken, 1 Grant 83,
it was declared to have this effect. But later cases hold that the intent was to
limit the equitable jurisdiction to cases where there was no adequate remedy
at law. Since, therefore, Gibson had stretched the remedy at law to fit the
needs of the case, by allowing a recovery of the price as damages, this is
now held to be the only way in which a vendor can get specific relief. See
Kauffman's Appeal, 55 Pa. 383; Dech's App. 57 Pa. 467 ; Smaltz's App. 99 Pa.
310. If, then, the present contract satisfies the Statute of Frauds, the vendor
should recover the price.
The first section of the English Statute of Frauds provided that when
parties attempted to create estates in land by parol and without a writing
"signed by the parties so making and creating" the estate, the result of the
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attempt should be to create an estate at will and no more. This
provision was enacted in Pennsylvania in our act of April 10, 1772. It was
the fourth section of the English statute that forbade actions on verbal contract3 to scl lands. To render a contract to buy or to sell land enforceable at
least some memorandum of the terms had to be signed by the "party to lie
charged." That is. if it became necessary for one party to sue the other, the
plaintiff had to produce a contract signed by the defendant. This section is
law in all but a very few of the United States. Pennsylvania is one of the few
in which it is not the law.
It would seem to follow that since this suit is upon a purely executory
contract, the question of a writing becomes inmaterial. If the plaintiff were
satisfied to enforce his contract by the recovery of damages rather than the
price, this would be true. Specific payment of the price is enforced, however,
only when the vendee is already owner in the eyes of a court of equity. The
contract must have effected an equitable conversion. The Pennsylvania
courts early held, however, that it was the legislative intent to forbid the
creation of even an equitable estate by parol, and that therefore the contract
to sell or buy would only be enforced specifically where the Statute of Frauds
had been complied with. It has been pointed out, however, that under the
first section only the parties creating the estate are required to sign, and as the
grantor is the "creator," and as he has signed in the case at bar, the statute
would appear to be satisfied.
In McClintock v. Oil Co., 146 Pa. 144, Justice Mitchell said: "Whether
the equitable doctrine of mutuality has any proper place in cases arising under
the Statute of Frauds is a vexed question on which our decisions are not in
harmony, and arebadly in need of review and authoritativesettlement." This
is a serious error. Such a statement from a Supreme Court justice is enough to
cause doubt where none previously existed. The decisions of our Supreme
Court are in perfect harmony on this point, as we will show. To indicate the
confusion, Justice Mitchell first cites Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. 424. This case
holds that a vendor who has signed can get specific performancte, though the
vendee has not signed. He then cites Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. 335, and Sands
8notsignedcanv. Arthur, 84 Pa. 479. These cases hold that a vendor who has
not have specific performance. This raises the question, is the sole signature
of the vendor enough to distinguish the cases.
In Wilson v. Clarke, 1 W. & S. 554, it was held that the reason for refusing
a vendor specific performance when he had not signed, is that, since the
vendee could not enforce specifically such a contract, the need of mutuality
should prevent'the vendor from enforcing it. Either both should be able to
secure specific performance or neither should have it. The doctrine of this
case has been uniformly approved and followed in later cases, and the doctrine
of mutuality is thus invoked to defeat the vendor's action here, as it had been
invoked by Gibson as the reason for giving him specific relief in cases where
he had signed. Cook v. Grant, supra. The following cases follow: Wilson v.
Clarke, supra,Meason v. Kaine, 63 Pa. 335 and 67 Pa. 126; Sands v. Arthur,
84 Pa. 479; Sausser v. Steinmetz, 88 Pa. 324; Swisshelm v. The Swissvale
Laundry Co., 95 Pa. 367. On the other hand, where the vendor has signed, he
has uniformly been granted specific performance. Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa.
424; Johnston v. Cowan, 59"Pa. 275; Swisshelm v. TheSwissvale Laundry
Co., supra. This involves no violation of the principle of mutuality, however,
for in such a case the vendee also can secure specific performance. Lowry v.
Mehaffy, 10 W. 387; MeFarson's App., 11 Pa. 503; Shoofstall, 2 Grant, 209;
Smith's App., 69 Pa. 474 ; Sylvester v. Boren, 132 Pa. 467.
The defendant's argument is this: "SinceI could not have enforced a con-
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tract against you, signed by myself alone, you should not be allowed to enforce a contract against me, signed by you alone." This sounds plausible.
The simple answer is, that the Legislature has seen fit to make the vendor's
signature essential, whichever party may be suing; while it has made the
vendee's signature superfluous, whichever party may be suing. If the
vendor signs, both parties can have specific performance; if he fails to sign,
neither can have it. The need of mutuality is, therefore, fully met. If the
vendee's feelings have been hurt because less weight is attached to his signature than to that of the vendor, he must blame the Legislature and not the
courts. In Parish v. Koons, 1 Parsons, 78, a lower court judge was actually
misled by the counsel for the defendant into confusing the argument
suggested above with the well settled doctrine of mutuality. The decision is
clearly wrong and in direct conflict with the Supreme Court cases.
If the fourth section of the English statute were law in Pennsylvania the
law would undoubtedly be that every contract for the sale of lands should be
signed by both parties in order that it might be enforceable specifically by
either. True, this is not the rule in England nor in those American states in
which the fourth section is law. But this is because the doctrine of mutuality
is not applied to cases arising under the Statute of Frauds in any state outside
of Pennsylvania, with the sole exception of Maryland. The well nigh
universal rule outside of these states is, that either party can have his choice
of damages or of specific performance if the other party has signed. The injustice of holding a man bound to one who is himself free to watch land values
change and then elect to enforce or repudiate the contract as he finds to his
interests, is astounding. As Lord Redesdale said in Lawrence v. Butler, 1
Sch. & Lef. 13, this construction is certainly effective in making the statute
a "Statute of Frauds." It would be interesting to examine the flimsy excuses
given for the rule adopted, but space forbids. The cases are fully collected in
the note in 1 Ames Cas. Eq. 421. When one deals with an infant he puts
himself in just such a trying position. So does one who has procured a
promise by means of fraud. But why equity should multiply such situations
is hard to see. Possibly the idea is to punish the defendant for his ingenuousness in not demanding the signature of the oth6r party at the time the writing
was drawn up.
Whether a deed was tendered or filed in court by the plaintiff, we are not
told. Undoubtedly he should have done so. The defendant has raised no
objection on this score. We must, therefore, presume that the plaintiff has
done his duty. This being true, the court below should have given the plaintiffjudgment for the contract price, $5,000, with interest and costs. Of course
we do not approve the rule, recognized in a few states, that after a tender has
been rejected, the vendor can keep his land and get the price too. See Warvelle on Vendors, page .961. We presume that the plaintiff has filed a proper
deed, and it will be delivered to the defendant on his payment of the judgment.
But even if a deed had not been filed, the learned court below has fallen
into error in his reasoning. All of the cases he discusses in the matter of
damages, are cases of suits by a vendee against a vendor. This is a suitfor the
price. It would naturally be supposed that the measures of damage in the
two cases would be the counterparts of each other. Such does not seem to be
the case. Even on a parol contract, the vendor can recover the value of his
bargain. Ellet v. Paxson, 2 W. & S. 418. He may resell the land and then sue
and recover the difference between the contract price and the price received at
the resale. Ashcom v. Smith, 2 P. & W. 211; McCombs v. McKennan, 2
Watts & S. 216; Bowser v. Cessna, 62 Pa. 148. But when the vendee sues for
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damages for breach of a parol contract, a long line of cases holds that he can
only recover what he may have paid on the price, (with interest, if he has not
been in possession) and costs. He cannot get the value of his bargain. See
Tyson v. Eyrick, 141 Pa. 296, which collects the cases. The reason given is
that many a man would prefer to perform specifieally rather than pay large
damages, and since the Statute of Frauds was intended to prevent men from
being forced to convey their lands when they had not promised in writing to
do so, large damages would possibly defeat the purpose of the statute. See
opinion by Williams in Thompson v. Sheplar, 72 Pa. 160. There is no such
objection to compelling a vendee to pay large damages, if he should refuse to
pay the price.
The learned court below not unnaturally infers that, since the foregoing
reason is the one given for refusing a veudee the value of his bargain, when
the contract is in parol, he will certainly be given the value of his bargain
w'hen the Statute of Frauds is satisfied by a writing. Strange to say, this is
not the ease. The rule applies equally to written contracts. See Bowser v.
Cessna, 62 Pa. 148. The only way the vendee can get the value of his bargain
is by enforcing the contract specifically. The Pennsylvania courts follow
the English rule, which is the result of local conditions not existing in Pennsylvania. Innumerable cases in other American states have recognized the
peculiar circumstances that gave rise to the English rule and accordingly
repudiate it, allowing the vendee the value of his bargain in an action for
damages. See 3 Sedg. Dam. (8th. ed) 197.
The judgment must be for theplaintiff,but must be amended in accordance
with theforegoing opinion.
HARVEY vs. SHAW.
Mlarriedwoman suretyfor husband on note drawn in Maryland and executed
while on a visit in that jtate-,Lex loci contractusapplies-Act of 1893 inapplicable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiff is a resident of Hagerstown, Md., while the defendant is a married woman, resident of Carlisle, Pa. Defendanu while in Hagerstown,
signed as surety, a promissory note drawn by her husband in favor of the
plaintiff. The latter brings the note over into Pennsylvania and sues out a
summons from this court. The note was dated at Hagerstown, Md., and made
payable there. By the law of Maryland a married woman can be a surety for
her husband.
H. C. Stewart for plaintiff.
Rule that law of place where promissory note is endorsed governs an
action against the endorsee. In construing commercial paper, the law of the
lex loci contractus applies. 1 Neb. 108; 103 Mass. 318; 6 Vroom, (N. J.) 285.
Murdock for defendant.
When it is attempted to enforce an executory contract, valid in another
jurisdiction, but some of the provisions of which are contrary to the law or
policy of the forum, the law of the forum must prevail. 2 Pepper & Lewis,
3272. Married woman may not become accommodation indorser, maker,
guarantor or surety for another. Act June 8, 1893; leyer v. Capp, 3 D. R.
392.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

3. :-Had Mrs. Shaw, the defendant in this case, when she
signed the note as surety for her husband, been a resident of any other state
than that of Pennsylvania, and then come to reside at Carlisle, nothing
REXACH,
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would be in the way for plaintiff to recover, since the law of Maryland, where
the contract was made and ought to have been performed, allows a married
woman to act as surety for her husband. This case then would come within
the general rule of thejus gentium that in regard to question of minority, or
majority, competency or incompetency, incapabilities incident to coverture,
guardianship, emancipation and other personal qualities and disabilities the
law of the place where the contract is made or the act done furnishes the rifle
of decision. Huey's Appeal, I Grant, 51; Braun v. Keally, 146 Pa. 519; Andrews v. Herriot, 4 Cowen (N. Y.) 508, (note); Watson v. Brewster, 1 Pa. 381 ;
Benners v. Clemens, 58 Pa. 24; Bank v. Earle, 13 Peters (U. S.) 520; Norton
on Bills and Notes, p. 184 et seq.
But the laws of a nation or state have not, ex propio vigore, any binding
force beyond the limits of its territory. Any effect they have, is ex-comitate;
and no people are bound to enforce or hold valid in their courts of justice, any
contract which is in evasion or fraud of their own laws, or injurious to their
public rights, or offends their morals, or contravenes their policy, or
violates a public right. Huey's Appeal. I Grant 51; Emory v. Grenough, 3
Dallas, 368, (note); Coni. v. Hembrecht, 4 S. & R. 218; Com. v. Edwards, 6
Binney 202; Kent's Com. vol. 2, p. 458 and 459 and note; Clark on Contracts,
p. 504 et seq.
The exercise of comity in admitting or restraining the application of the
lex loci must unavoidably rest in sound judicial discretion dictated by the
circumstances of the case. MacCabe v. Blymyre, 9 Phila. 615.
As pointed out by the very able counsel for the defendant in his brief, the
act of June 8, 1893, (P. & L. Digest of Pa. Laws, col. 2890) declares that a
married woman "may not become accommodation indorser, maker, guarantor,
or surety for another." The courts have time and again sustained this act,
even when on the face of the contract it appears that the act had not been
violated, but when in fact it had been so.
In 165 Pa. 526, it was held that the liability of a married woman is not
determined alone by the form of the obligation ; but if the object was to evade
the disability created by the statute, the fact and not the form will determine
her liability. In Real Estate Co. v. Roop, (132 Pa. 496) the case of a judgment
note signed by both husband and wife to aid the husband in his business, it
was said: "If not given as surety for her husband, it was given upon his importunity and to aid him in his business, one of the very perils from which
the law ought to protect a married woman."
We do not want to cast any disgraceful reflections upon the character of
Mr. Shaw as a law-abiding citizen, but the facts of this case leave no doubt in
our minds that this visit of Mr. and Mrs. Shaw to Hagerstown, Md., and
their signing there the note in question in favor of the plaintiff, have been
made in evasion of our statute, which forbids a married woman "to become a
surety for another," and therefore we cannot allow it to be enforced in this
court. Should we rule otherwise, we will not need to wait very long to see
a procession of unscrupulous husbands carrying their wives across the MasonDixon line in order to avoid by this trip tle wise proviso of our statute of June
8, 1893; because what wife, loving the peace of her home, will resist the entreaties and importunities of her husband to take a pleasure trip to Maryland
and there become his surety, making in this way lawful what our statute has
declared to be unlawful?
Therefore we sustain the plea of the defendant and order a non-suit in her
favor.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Mrs. Shaw, a resident of Carlisle, while on a visit in Hagerstown, Md.,

THE FORUM

129

executed to Harvey, as surety for her husband, the note in suit, which by its
terms, is payable in Hagerstown. A married woman may by the Maryland
law, validly make such contracts. Suit having been brought in this court,
the question is, is the Maryland or the Pennsylvania law applicable?
It does not appear that the Shaws went to Maryland in order to make the
contract, and therefore for the purpose of subjecting Mrs. Shaw to the law of
that state. Nor does it appear that Harvey, when he accepted the note, knew
that Mrs. Shaw was a resident of Pennsylvania, or that the law of this state
renders void a married woman's suretyship. He was in a sense, bound to
know the law of his own state, but was not bound to know that of Pennsylvania, at least until he knew that Mirs. Shaw was from Pennsylvania. If
she can invoke our law, she may perpetrate a fraud on Harvey, by inducing
him to give credit to her husband by an apparently valid assumption, which
is not valid. He had no notice from the state of his own law, that Mrs. Shaw
might be-incapable of making the contract. Had it appeared that Mrs. Shaw
was taken by her husband to Hagerstown in order to make the contract, and
in order that she should be bound by it, and that Harvey knew of this circumstance, it would be fair to him to hold the contract void. Under the actual
facts, so to hold would work on him a grievous wrong.
In Milliken v. Pratt, 12.5 Mass. 374, a married woman, domiciled in
Massachusetts, made a contract in Maine as guarantor for her husband. The
contract was valid in Maine but void in Massachusetts, whose law, while
permitting married women to contract generally, forbade her becoming surety
for her husband. The court of Massachusetts, nevertheless, held her liable.
This case is cited as authority in Baum v. Birchall, 150 Pa. 161, and a bond
made in Delaware, by a married woman domiciled in Pennsylvania, in 18S5.
when bonds of married women were void in this state, was held valid because
valid by the Delaware law. Cf. Minor, Conflict of Laws, 146.
A citizen of one state does not. when he goes into another, carry the -law
of the former with him. Acts done by him will be subject to .the criminal
law of the latter. There is-no reason why torts and contracts should not be
subject to its law also. Nor is there any reason why incapacities, which are
creatures of law, should go beyond the jurisdiction whose law has made them,
nor why, on a return to the domicile, its forum should give extension to its
incapacities beyond the boundaries. We are aware of the confusion in the
decisions and shall not attempt to dissipate it. What we decide now is, that
if B, a citizen of Pennsylvania, deemed by our law incapable of making a
certain contract, goes into Maryland, which recognizes no such incapacity,
and makes a contract of the class with A, a Marylander, who has no knowledge of the Pennsylvania law, nor of the fact that B is domiciled in this state,
A can enforce this contract against B in a forum of this state.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

O'CONNOR vs. C. V. R. R.
Railroadticket- Unlimited as to time of use-Right to have it redeemedRights as between the seller and purchaser-Damagefor refusal to accept
ticket.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Ten years ago plaintiff purchased from defendant company a first'class,
unlimited railroad ticket entitling him to ride from Carlisle to Harrisburg.
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The ticket was put away and apparently forgotten, but never actually used
until January, 1904. Plaintiff had occasion to go to Harrisburg and tendered
ticket to conductor who refused to accept it. Plaintiff paid his fare and now
brings this action for damages. Breach of contract.
Reed for plaintiff.
In the absence of limitation as to time, ticket is good at any time.
Penna. R. R. Co. v. Spyker, 105 Pa. 142.
11. . Stewart for defendant.
A ticket is a contract on which action must be brought within six years.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SHOWALTER J. :-This is an action of assumpsit by O'Connor against the

Cumberland Valley R. R. to recover damages for refusing to accept a ticket
purchased 10 years ago and thereby being required to pay fare. The facts
state that the ticket was a first class one and unlimited. No time was mentioned within which it could be used, nor were there any other conditions
attached to it.
The decisions of the various states do not correspond with each other as
to what a ticket is. Some declare that it is the evidence of a contract between
the purchaser and the selling company, while others pronounce it a mere
receipt, or voucher adopted for convenience to show that the passenger has
paid his fare between the places named on the ticket. Whatever it may
be, it must be conceded that. it represents a right on the part of the purchaser
to ride on the train of the defendant, if presented at the proper time.
Railroad companies carrying passengers have the right to make reasonable
rules and regulations for conducting their business. This company was not
bound to issue an unlimited ticket and had the right to insist and provide
that the ticket should be used within a specifid time, if it had such printed or
written condition on it, but no such condition appears. Therefore, it is to be
presumed that this ticket was good whenever presented, for traveling between
Carlisle and Harrisburg.
In Penna. R. R. Co. v. Spyker, 105 Pa. 142. Spyker, the appellee, bought a
railroad excursion ticket for one first class passage from Williamsport to
Philadelphia and return, on which he traveled to Philadelphia. He did not
u-e the return coupon of the ticket until mare than two years afterwards,
when he started to travel from Philadelphia to Harrisburg. The ticket was
accepted for passage on the Penna. R. R. from Philadelphia to Harrisburg,
but after leaving Harrisburg, the conductor of the train declined to accept
the ticket and demanded fare. Thereupon the conductor stopped the train
some distance from the station and the appellee was ordered to leave the train.
There was no notice of any kind to show that the ticket was not an unlimited
one, nothing whatever on the face of it to indicate that it was limited as to
time, nor was there any competent evidence beyond the ticket, to prove any
limitation and notice thereof to the appellee. The court held, thata round trip
railroad excursion ticket, not limited by its terms, is good until used, unless
the purchaser was personally notified to the contrary at the time he bought it.
The purchaser is not bound to make inquiries about regulations of the company, not printed on the ticket.
The ticket in the casa at bar is analogous, in so far that it contains no conditions orlimitations,such being the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
The purchaser of the ticket had the right to travel from Carlisle to Harrisburg
on his ticket whenever presented, and the railroad company had no right to
compel him to pay his fare, even though he could have the ticket redeemed,
nor had it a right to eject him if he had refused to pay his fare.
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The Pennsylvania courts have laid down the measure of damages for
ejecting a passenger from a train on which lie is justly entitled to travel, to
include the actual expenses incurred, compensation for loss of time, interruption of business, bodily or mental suffering, humiliation and injury to
feelings. The appellee has suffered no injury of this kind. When the conductor refused to accept the ticket, instead of allowing himself to be put off
the train, in the face of his right to be carried on the ticket, lie meekly complied with the request of the conductor and paid his fare. This he should not
have done, but insisted on remaining on the train until expelled by the conductor or any other railroad officer clothed with the proper authority. Then
certainly an action for damages would lie. The purchaser has not lost anything by being compelled to pay his fare, for by the act of Mlay 6, 1863, P. L.
582,
5, the ticket can be redeemed, which redemption would be the same
amount as the fare paid. Since the passenger paid his fare and since he can
have his ticket redeemed, the court is of the opinion that only nominal
damages can now be recovered to the amount of six cents.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

The ticket furnished to O'Connor, gave him a right to a ride from
Carlisle to Harrisburg. It named no time in which this right must be demanded. O'Connor could, therefore, demand it the next day, or week, or
month, or year, or decade. Nothintg indicates that a delay in demanding the
passage, however great, could have injurious consequences for the company.
The court, therefore, rightly decided that the ticket entitled O'Connor to a
ride ten years after its issue. The act of May 6th, 1863, 2 P. & L. 3992, seems
to make such a ticket redeemable at any time, however distant.
When he tendered this ticket, it should have been received by the company as evidence of payment of his fare. Its compelling him to pay again
was a wrong, and O'Connor is entitled to get back what he paid with interest.
It is true that he retains the ticket, and that he may use it for another trip.
But, he may never desire another trip. A right to a trip is not equivalent to
the right to the money which he would have to pay for the trip. It is not a
legal tender for the discharge of the right to the money.
The act of May 6th, 1863, supra, xlakes it the duty of the company to
provide for the redemption of tickets wholly or partially unused, for the price
paid for them, or when they have been partially used, for a proportional part
thereof. But it does not appear that the price paid by O'Connor on the train,
was what he hmd paid for the ticket ten years before. It may have been less,
it may have been more. If the ticket is offered for redemption, only what
was paid for it ten years ago could be recovered, without interest. Even if
the price of tickets is now the same as then, the interest on the money paid by
O'Connor to procure the ride, would iot be reimbursed him by redemption of
the tioket.
While it is the duty of the company to "provide for the redemption" of
tickets, it does not appear that this duty has been performed. It would be
vexatious to compel O'Connor, after he is permitted in this suit to obtain
merely nominal damages, to bring another suit for the price paid for the
original ticket. He should have been permitted to recover the price he paid
for the fare with iiterest. The payment by the company of this amount,
would ipsofacto work the redemption and extinction of the original ticket,
and the court might conditihn any execution upo.u the tender of this ticket to
the company.
Judgment reversed, with v.f. d. n.
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CLELAND vs. STRIPER.
Trepass-.Maliciousprosecution-Probablecause-AMalice-Acquittal as evidence of want ofprobable cause and malice.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Striper instituted a prosecution against Cleland for stealing potatoes from
his cellar. Two boys, ten years old, told Striper that they had seen Cleland taking them from the cellar. They were mistaken in this, the person seen being
another.
Cleland was tried and acquitted, the boys refusing to testify that he was
the mail whom they had seen.
This is all action for malicious prosecution.
The trial court told the jury that the acquittal was evidence of want of
probable cause and also of malice, and allowed the jury to say, if they could,
that the statements of boys, ten years old, were not probable cause.
Cleland recovered $1,000.
Motion for a new trial.
Arnold for the motion.
Acquittal not evidence of lack of probable cause. Ross v. Innis, 26 Ill.
256; Miller v. Hammer, 141 Pa. 196; Quin v. Crowell, 4 Whart. 334; Bernar
v. Dunlap, 94 Pa. 329.
Wallis, contra.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

BARNER, J. :-This is a motion for a new trial, based on the ground of
alleged error in the charge of this court on the trial of the case before the
jury.
The action was for damages for malicious prosecution, in which the plaintiff was charged by the defendant with tile crime of stealing, the result of the
trial being that the plaintiff was acquitted. It appears that the defendant in
this action was the victim of a theft and was informed by two small boys, ten
years of age, that they had seen the plaintiff in the act of doing the deed.
Now the statement of facts herewith asserts positively that in this the boys
were mistaken. At any rate, the case came to trial, and the boys refused to
testify as the prosecutor had anticipated, and as they had told him, and the
result was that the plaintiff was acquitted. Then the plaintiff brings this
suit against this prosecutor for malicious prosecution. At the close of the
hearing in this court on the trial, this court charged, "that the acquittal was
evidence of probable cause and of malice" and permitted the jury to say that
"statements of boys ten years old were not probable cause." The verdict was
for the plaintiff and on a motion for a new trial the defendant now takes exceptions to the parts of the charge above quoted.
In order to establish malicious prosecution, it is necessary to show an
arrest, a prosecution either at civil or criminal law, the completion of that
trial favorable to the defendant in the same, and that the prosecution was
instituted maliciously and without probable cause, and that the defendant
suffered damages. 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, 498.
But it is very essential in order to establish a case of malicious prosecution,
that you have both a lack of probable cause and malice. You must have
present a state of facts, the existence of which is for the jury, which will, in
the opinion of the court, constitute a malicious and reckless or willful prosecu-
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tion which is not warranted, and which a prudent man would not consider
sufficient cause. The jury passed on the existence of the facts and the court
determines whether or not those facts constitute the offense complained of.
In this case, two questions present themselves, which it will be necessary
to answer. The first is, does an acquittal in a case of this kind show, or
rather is it evidence of lack of probable cause and also of malice? And the
second is, is it true that statements of boys of the age of ten years do not
constitute probable cause sufficient to relieve a man in an action for malicious
prosecution ?
' In taking up the first question, as to the acquittal, we are of the opinion
that this court erred in its charge when it said that the acquittal was evidence
of malice, but believe that it was right when it charged that the acquittal
was evidence of absence of probable cause.
It has been held that the mere fact that there was an acquittal does not
show lack of probable cause. And on the other hand it has been held that an
acquittal raises a presumption of want of probablc cause. Fell, J., says that
a verdict of guilty is evidence of probable cause, and that an acquittal is
evidence, though slight, of want of probable cause. So that it is a question
for the jury to determine whether the acquittal, in connection with other existing facts, establish a lack of probable cause. Grohman v. Kirschman, 168
Pa. 203 ; Ross v. Innis, 26 Ill. 256 ; Thorpe v. Balliet, 25 Ill. 339 ; Gilliford v.
Windel, 108 Pa. 142.
The necessity of showing probable cause is on the plaintiff in the prosecution, now being defendant in the suit for malicious prosecution, ONLY after
the plaintiff here has established a want of probable cause. In other words,
the plaintiff must first show a want of probable cause, which must be
overwhelming in its effect on the jury before they can give damages for the
plaintiff. This impression is met by the defendant with proof of probable
cause. But the burden is on the plaintiff. Now it has been held that if the
plaintiff has shown a former acquittal that the presumption is in his favor and
that it is incumbent on the defendant in order to prevent recovery to show
that he had probable cause notwithstanding the fact -that he could not prove
conclusively the crime which he had charged to the plaintiff. In other words,
the showing of an acquittal shifts the burden of proof. But the question of
the guilt of the plaintiff of the crime charged in the prosecution is immaterial
as to the existence of the probable cause.. Mitchel v. Logan, 172 Pa. 349;
Woodward v. Sample, 25 Pa. 275; Gyles v. Jeffries, 5 Dist. R. 129; Bruff v.
Kendrick, 21 Super. 468; Orr v. Seiler, 1 Penny. 445; Barhight v. Tammay,
158 Pa. 545; Miller v. Hammer, 141 Pa. 196; Quin v. Crowell, 4 Wharton
334 ; Bernar v. Dunlap, 94 Pa. 329.
So we find that the acquittal was evidence of the want of probable cause,
and that the court was right in so instructing. But we do not think he was
right in charging that the acquittal was evidence of malice. Malice may be inferred from the want of probable cause, but it is not conclusive evidence of
malice. It is evidence of the fact that probable cause existed, but does
not establish want of probable cause. The acquittal in this case was not
evidence of any malice only through the contingent finding of thejury of
the existence of want of probable cause. If we considered that the acquittal
showed conclusively that there was no probable cause, and that this want of
probable cause showed conclusively that there was malice, then we would have
a case made out. But it is the opinion of this court that the showing of malice,
an essential point in a case of this kind, cannot be arrived at by such a circuituous and contingent method. The acquittal is no evidence of malice. Ber-

134

THEFORUM

nar v. Dunlap, 94 Pa. 329; Ritter v. Ewing, 174 Pa. 341 ; Deitz v. Langfitt, 63
Pa. 234; Mclafferty v. Philp, 151 Pa. 86.
In the next place we will consider the question of the statements of boys
ten years of age. Do such statements constitute probable cause? First, let us
ask, what is probable cause?
Probable cause is a mixed question of law and of fact. Whether the fact
exists is a question for the jury, and whether that fact existing is probable
cause, is for the court. Probable cause is "a deceptive appearance arising from
facts and circumstances, misapprehended or misunderstood so far as to produce belief." But mere belief will not justify one in bringing an action. The
prosecutor should have direct information, and not rely on a floating rumor
which would not appeal to a prudent man in a convincing manner. Knowledge of a former theft will not be sufficient grounds to suspect a mail of
another theft or another crime. 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, pages 498 and
502; Sublert v. Price, 5 W. & S. 438. Gibson J. ; Schondorf v. Griffith, 13
Super. 580; Markley v. Snow, 207 Pa. 447; Stein v. Labar, 16 W. N. C. 273 ;
Smith v. Ege, 52 Pa. 119; McClafferty v. Philp, 151 Pa. 86; Winebiddle v.
Porterfield, 9 Pa. 137 ; Huchestein v. Ins. Co., 205 Pa. 227.
It seems to be the prevailing custom, substantiated by the weight of
authority, that if one brings a charge against another by reason of having
heard something from a friend, or from a servant, or from a detective, or from
almost any combination of circumstances and facts and reports, which would
be taken as ground for belief by the ordinary prudent man, that an action
will not lie against him for malicious prosecution. But a person cannot be
arrested and compelled to stand trial and defend himself where the grounds
for the accusation are floating rumor or some trivial gossip, or in fact any
thing on which ordinarily a careful, thinking and considerate mal would not
base a belief in their truth. In addition to this he must act in good faith, and
if it were showdi that although he had excellent ground for the suit, yet he
knew that his suit was wholly based on that which he knew was false or something impossible, he would not be relieved. Smith v. Ege, 52 Pa. 419;
Bernar v. Dunlap, 94 Pa. 329; Gilliford v. Windel, 108 Pa. 142; Bretmesser v.
Steir, 13 Phila. 80.
So that ,it appears that if instead of having been told by two boys, ten
years old, that they saw the plaintiff crawling into his cellar, and taking the
potatoes, the defendant had been told that same thing by two men he would
most certainly have been justified in bringing the charge, providing no other
disability would bar his informants. Now the question arises, was tile statement of these boys different in the eyes of the law than those of two men?
Is a man justified in prosecuting on the bare ground of their statelpents?
Is a man justified in putting confidence in such reports? Canlla man be
sued, and compelled to defend, when the action has been instigated by the
statements of two boys only ten years of age?
We have not been able to find where in any case a defense to a malicious
prosecution has been based on statements of infants. But it is the opinion
of the court that statements made by them in cases of this kind, especially
when not less than nine years, and attending circumstances other than age
do not bar, are sufficient grounds on which a prudent man would base such
a belief as would lead to a prosecution.
At common law criminal intent was not permitted to be shown where
the defendant was under the age of seven years, but over seven and under
fourteen, criminal intent could be shown, and over fourteen the capacity to
form criminal intent was irrebutable on the ground of age alone. At common
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law also, where under fourteen a witness was necessarily examined before
they were allowed to testify, but no oaths were administered to a child under
the age of nine.
So that, reasoning by analogy, we would seem to reach the conclusion that
providing the boys in this case were not rendered incompetent for any other
reason than age and had they been willing to testify, their testimony could
have been received. For this reason it is reasonable to say that their statements
were probable cause for the prosecution in the criminal case preceding this
one. It is also true that at common law, a man under the sentence of death
was not allowed to testify, Reg. v. Webb, 11 Cox C. C. 133, and under the
present act of 1887, one under the sentence of death was allowed to testify,
Comm. v. Clemmer, 190. Pa. 202, so that the tendency is towards competency,
and if this is in the case of witnesses, it would seem to follow that thetendency
would also be to give more weight to the statements of those although not
under oath, whose competency as witnesses is more or less questionable.
Of course it musu be accepted o the ground that the boys were not wilfully misleading the prosecutor, who in turn was willingly being misled. But

in this case there is no as.sertion or intimation of ally bad faith on tile part of
either the boys or the prosecutor.
Whatever the above results may be, as regards the statements of boys of
the age of ten in relation to ground for probable cause in a prosecution, it still
remains that it is for the jury to find the facts and for the courts to determine
the want of probable cause. III this,.the court undoubtedly erred. Huckestein vs. Ins. Co., 205 Pa. 227.
Therefore, because the court in this trial charged that "acquittal
was evidence of malice," and because tile court allowed the jury to say, "that
statements of boys ten years old were not probable cause," it is the opinion
of this court that a new trial should be granted.
New trial ordered.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

A "malicious prosecution" is one instituted both with malice and without
probable cause. A prosecution with malice but also with probable cause, and
one without malice but also without probable cause, would not be a "malicious
prosecution." Gilliford v. Wiudel, 108 Pa. 142.
The inquiry regarding probable cause, must be directed to the inception of
the prosecution. After the trial, facts are or may be known to the prosecutor,
which were not known before. It wouhl paralyze the administration ofjustice,
if no one could safely prosecute, unless he was as wise before the criminal
trial as after.
The facts known to the prosecutor when he began the prosecution may be
shown, and if they would not unreasonably induce him to believe in the guilt
of the accused, and he did believe in that guilt, his action was not without probable cause. The proof of these facts is addressed to"the jury. Whether they constitute a cause for a man's reasonably believing in the guilt, is for tile court to
decide. The court below has properly held that it would be error to refer this
question to the jury.
Two boys, ten years old, told Striper that they had seen Cleland taking
the potatoes from Striper's cellar. Was he reasonably convinced of Cleland's
guilt?
The statement of the boys was not sworn to. But Striper had no authority
to subject them to an oath. It is not unreasonable, it may be reasonable, to
believe the unsworn statements of persons.
Was it unreasonable to believe the assertions of boys ten years of age?
These boys might have been witnesses, and a conviction could have beeli procured by means of their uncorroboraled testimony. Whatever statement,
sworn to, a jury may rely upon, a prosecutor may rely upon, though it be not
sworzi to.

Boys can observe certain simple facts as well as men. They can identify
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men known to'them. As the jury may have thought thatbeliefofthese boys was

unreasonable, and that their declarations were therefore not "probable cause,"
the trial court was in error in submitting the question. Had it appeared
clearly that the jury did not return a verdict for the plaintiff, because of their
opinion that the boys' statements were not probable cause, the error would not
have been serious.
The trial court told the jury that the acquittal of Cleland was evidence of
want of probable cause. The evidence on which Striper acted, viz : the declaration of the boys, was before the court. If these declarations were made, they
were probable cause, and they did not cease to be such, when Cleland was
subsequently acquitted. The court should have distinctly said that, if the
jury believed that the boys had told Striper what they were alleged to have
told him, he had probable cause, and the acquittal was not evidence that he
had not. But, the jury might have found that the boys had not stated what
they were alleged to have stated ; then the question would have presented
itself, was there other evidence as to the existence of probable cause.
The burden is on the plaintift in an action for damages for malicious
prosecution, to prove the want of probable cause. Lipowicz v. Jervis, 209 Pa.
315; Emerson v. Cochran, III Pa. 619. Does lie sufficiently prove this, by
proving an acquittal ? The discharge of the plaintiff, Cleland, by the committing magistrate would have put on St riper the burden of proving that he had
probable cause: i. e. would have been prima facie evidence of want of
probable cause. Barhight v. Tammany, 158 Pa. 545. But the acquittal, by
the immense preponderance of authority, prodaces no such result. Bekkeland v. Lyons, 96 Texas 2.55; 64 L. R. A. 474, and extensive note to this case.
Against this great array of decisions, there is 'a dictum in Grohmann v.
Kirschnian, 168 Pa. 189, that "a verdict of acquittal is evidence, thoughit may
be slight, of the.want of probable cause ;" but the force of this statement is
taken away by the remark that, while proof of the acquittal is receivable to
prove the end of the prosecution, and the removal of the obstacle of a pending
prosecution to the suit for damages, "the result of any inquiry behind the fact
of the verdict would seem to rostupon very unsatisfactory and unsafeground."
The acquittal may be due not to the want of primafacieevidence of guilt,
but to the overwhelming weight of the evidence for the defense. It might be
the duty of the jury to acquit, though it believed the guilt of the defendant,
for it is instructed to acquit unless it believes the guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Evidencecommanded before prosecution might fail at the trial. As
then the acquittal may he produced by other causes than the want of probable
cause, it would be improper to allow it to be considered as, of itself, evidence
of want of probable cause, upon which the jury might rely. This the court
clearly did in this cas'e.
The court also told the jury that the acquittal was evidence, that is legally
sufficient evidence, of the malice of Striper. The considerations already noticed
with respect to probable cause are at least as forcible in this connection. The
acquittalshows merely that the jury is not convinced ofguilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not even show that it is not convinced of guilt. But,
even if it was not convinced, how would this show that the prosecutor was
not convinced ? or ought not to have been convinced ? The prosecutor need
not be so fully convinced as the trial jury, for his task is to cause the investigation ; theirs is to cause the imposition of a punishment. He can seldom
have all the evidence that they have. He often has evidence at the time of
the prosecution, that lie cannot command at the trial. The defendant's evidence is not usually known to the prosecutor. To allow an acquittal to be
sufficient evidence of malice would practically be to give an acquitted defendant, in a large percentage of cases, a right to damages. As the court said in
Skidmore v. Bricker, 77 Ill. 164, "if the record of acquittal was to be read in
evidence on the trial of this class of cases, a recovery could be had ir almost
every case of acquittal."
The acquittal could be of utility as evidence only as it tended to show a
want of sufficient evidence to justify the institution of the prosecution, and it
could be evidence of malice only so far as a want of probable cause would
evidence malice. It is true that a want of probable cause is said to be prima
facie-evidence of malice. Gilliford v. Windel, 108 Pa. 143 ; Madison v. Penna.
R. R. Co., 147 Pa. 509; Emerson v. Cochran, ll Pa. 622; but we havealready
concluded that the want of probable cause cannot be safely inferred merely
from the acquittal.
Judgment affirmed.

